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BOOK REVIEWS
In Defense of Natural Theology: a Post-Humean Assessment, edited by James 
F. Sennett  and Douglas Groothuis. InterVarsity Press, 2005. Pp. 333. $26.00 
(Paper).
PAUL C. ANDERS, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Aft er a brief introduction, the book is divided into two parts. Part one is 
devoted to explicating Hume’s, and the Humean legacy’s, objections to 
natural theology. Part two, the much larger part, is devoted to defenses of 
the, thematically if not historically, traditional arguments of natural theol-
ogy. In these chapters are discussed versions of cosmological arguments 
and teleological arguments, the moral argument, arguments from religious 
experience, reason, and consciousness, and a cumulative case argument.
Part one oﬀ ers useful clarifi cation and raises important questions. 
Terrence Penelhum’s “Hume’s Criticism of Natural Theology” is an ex-
cellent one-chapter introduction to Hume’s writings on religion.
In “Hume’s Stopper and the Natural Theology Project” James F. Sennett  
discusses the oft -cited objection that the existence claims that are supported 
by natural theology arguments (if they are supported) do not even approach 
the claim of traditional theism, and so, cannot be good arguments for the-
ism. This objection includes, as Sennett  calls it, the oﬀ ering of candidate 
gods any of which could fi ll the role of creator/designer. Sennett  identifi es a 
“principle of ignorance” at the heart of Hume’s stopper. This principle dic-
tates that an argument be assessed based only on the information contained 
in the premises. As Sennett  puts it, “no substantive ‘hidden premises’ are 
allowed” (p. 87). Sennett  distinguishes between the logical and the ‘alethic’ 
evaluation of an argument. As I understand the distinction, while the need 
for a signifi cant amount of background knowledge would suggest a nega-
tive logical evaluation, this should not necessarily lead to a negative alethic 
evaluation of an argument. In short, the principle of ignorance militates 
against the principle of total evidence.
A concern arises based on Sennett ’s appeal to the principle of total evi-
dence. Sennett  claims the, “history of survival and thriving in the face of 
intense criticism sets theism apart from all other world religions” (p. 94). 
But, the philosophical theism we are supposed to be discussing is not a 
world religion. The survival and thriving of theism in the west may well 
be due to elements found in Judeo-Christian theism that lie outside the 
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purview of natural theology. Sennett  discusses the possible objection that 
he has moved beyond natural theology. He claims, “The existence of the-
ism as a religious viewpoint and its dialectical history are empirical facts 
about the world we live in,” and so in arguing, as he does, to the existence 
of the theistic God, Sennett  claims there are, “no nuances that require pre-
vious religious commitment to appreciate or accept” (p. 102). But again, 
the religious viewpoint to which Sennett  refers is not theism but Judeo-
Christian theism. While his argument may not require religious commit-
ment, his ‘empirical facts’ are replete with them. This seems problematic 
given how Sennett  uses these ‘facts’ in his argument.
A general question arises from part one as to just how forceful are 
Hume’s criticisms. There seems to be two lines of argument going through 
this fi rst part of the book, each echoed in part two. One line argues that 
Hume is largely correct in his objections to traditional natural theology, 
however, with a new focus, there is still much for natural theology to ac-
complish. Another line of argumentation concludes that Hume is largely 
incorrect in his objections to traditional natural theology and the project 
of natural theology remains intact and has been consistent into its contem-
porary employment.
Those who reject outright Hume’s criticisms do so based on problems 
with Hume’s overall project. While Todd M. Furman’s “In Praise of Hume: 
What’s Right About Hume’s Att ack on Natural Theology” cogently dem-
onstrates the problems of natural theology given Hume’s general philo-
sophical approach, Keith Yandell’s “David Hume on Meaning, Verifi cation, 
and Natural Theology” makes clear that Hume’s general approach cannot 
possibly be correct. Among other infelicities, Hume’s epistemology, and the 
epistemologies following in Hume’s legacy, are fundamentally inconsistent. 
In “Hume and the Moral Argument” Paul Copan shows how Hume’s ap-
proach to ethics is equally problematic. R. Douglas Geivett , in “David Hume 
and a Cumulative Case Argument,” rejects Hume’s criticisms as failing to 
address the true issue even in the natural theology of Hume’s day.
Those who seem to agree with Humean critiques concerning the tra-
ditional natural theology of Hume’s contemporaries argue that natural 
theology is by no means exhausted by traditional approaches. In the in-
troduction, the editors see contemporary natural theology as a modest 
project. Its arguments are not meant to prove God exists. Instead, they are 
to, “supply a signifi cant level of epistemic pedigree to the theistic or Chris-
tian beliefs of many people” (p. 16). In “Hume, Fine-Tuning and the ‘Who 
Designed God?’ Objection,” Robin Collins readily admits that traditional 
versions of teleological arguments fail. He argues the fi ne-tuning argu-
ment succeeds because its proponents incorporate a bett er understanding 
of the universe and the methods of non-deductive reasoning.
While the book contains strong arguments for the propriety and co-
gency of natural theology, there are some reasons for hesitation. For 
example, in the seventh chapter, “Hume and the Kalam Cosmological 
Argument,” Garrett  DeWeese and Joshua Rasmussen seek to defend a 
kalam type cosmological argument from Humean att acks—objections 
based on Hume’s views on causation and Hume’s stopper. While the es-
say is a helpful guide through the vast literature, it seems neither goal 
has been met. The authors argue that a particular principle of causality, 
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PC3—Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, can be sup-
ported by a particular principle of suﬃ  cient reason, PSR3'—Possibly 
there is a suﬃ  cient reason why some contingent concrete objects exist 
rather than none at all. Considering the proposition p, some contingent 
concrete objects exist rather than none at all, the authors argue from PSR3' 
to their conclusion. I reproduce the argument in its entirety:
(1) There is a possible world W in which q is true and q explains p. 
[from PSR3']
(2) p is contingently true and there is no explanation of p. [assumption 
for indirect proof]
(3) There is a possible world W in which (p and “there is no explana-
tion of p”) is true, and in which q is true and q explains (p and “there 
is no explanation of p”). [from (1) and (2)]
(4) In W, q explains p. [from (3) and the distribution of explanation 
over conjunction]
(5) Therefore, in W, p both has and does not have an explanation.
(6) It is not the case that p is contingently true and there is no explana-
tion of p. [from (12–19) by indirect proof]
(7) Therefore, it is not the case that, for any proposition p, p is contin-
gently true and there is no explanation of p. (p. 143, footnote 74)
Aside from the typographical error in the cited support for line 6, and 
that line (4) follows directly from line (1), there is a signifi cant problem. 
This argument employs a clear equivocation. As stated, (2) is most rea-
sonably understood to be about the actual world. It does follow from (2) 
that there is a possible world in which the conjunction, “p and ‘there is no 
explanation of p’,” is true. However, nothing in premises (1) and (2) entails 
the truth of the second conjunct of (3). If (5) is indeed to follow from the 
preceding premises, W must refer to the same world in both (1) and (3). 
Of course, this would follow if the actual world in (2) refers to the same 
possible world W in (1). If we understand (2) as being about the actual 
world, it does not follow from the argument that p has an explanation 
in the actual world unless W in (1) refers to the actual world. However, 
that claim does not follow from PSR3'. So, for (1) to be true, as entailed 
by PSR3', W cannot be given any further determination; however, for the 
argument to succeed, W in (1) must be equated with the actual world. 
Without this equivocation, the argument does not bar the possibility that p 
has an explanation in a possible world W not identical to the actual world, 
and that p does not have an explanation in the actual world. Of course, this 
problem does not show (7) false; however, this argument does not show 
it to be true.
Other possible problems may lurk in the shadows of two concepts that 
recur throughout the book: simplicity, and ad hocness. Interestingly, these 
concepts do not get entries in the book’s index, yet they are important 
considerations for almost every author in the book. In “Hume and the 
Argument from Consciousness,” J. P. Moreland discusses these consid-
erations as two of three issues in scientifi c theory acceptance. Discussing 
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simplicity as a type of epistemic virtue, he points out that, “given rival 
[theories] A and B, if A is simpler than B but B is more descriptively ac-
curate than A, then it may be inappropriate—indeed, question begging—
for advocates of A to cite A’s simplicity as grounds for judging it superior 
to B” (p. 275). Concerning ad hocness, Moreland explains, “given rival 
theories R and S, the postulation of e in R is ad hoc and question begging 
against advocates of S if e bears a relevant similarity to the appropriate 
entities in S, and in this sense is at home in S, but fails to bear this relevant 
similarity to the appropriate entities in R” (p. 274).
Moreland’s point regarding epistemic virtues seems to undermine the 
authors’ basic responses to Hume’s stopper. The oft en-repeated response 
to Hume’s candidate gods claim is to appeal to the simplicity of monothe-
ism over those rivals. However, it seems Hume is asking for descriptive 
accuracy above simplicity. If this is the case, which seems a straightfor-
ward reading, and if Moreland is correct, then many of the authors in this 
book are making an inappropriate response to Hume that may indeed be 
question begging.
Furthermore, many of the authors in part two claim their argument 
gains importance when placed within a cumulative case argument for 
God’s existence, the type of argument discussed by Geivett  in the last 
chapter. Geivett  rejects Humean criticisms based on a distinction be-
tween “generic theism”, an abstracted theism that can admit of particular 
versions, and “nonspecifi c theism,” which is mutually exclusive of any 
particular version of theism. Geivett  argues that if a particular version 
of theism is true, or rational, then generic theism is true, or rational. On 
the other hand, if a particular, specifi ed theism is true, or rational, then 
nonspecifi c theism is false, or irrational. Hume, according to Geivett , 
confuses general theism with nonspecifi c theism. While Hume shows 
nonspecifi c theism to be false, or irrational, this does not show general 
theism to be so as well because Hume’s criticisms do not show that no 
specifi ed theism can be true, or rational. In fact, Geivett  goes on to argue, 
Christian theism can be shown to be rational.
However, the move to a cumulative case argument that incorporates 
Christian distinctives may generate some Humean doubts about the natu-
ral theology project. One reason for skepticism may arise based on the 
claim made by a number of authors in this volume that positing certain 
features of God is not ad hoc because those features are held to apply to 
God for reasons outside the particular focus of their immediate discus-
sion. However, if a cumulative case must be made for God’s existence, then 
the problem of possible ad hocness ramifi es. As the relations between the 
arguments of natural theology become more complex, what can be incor-
porated in making each argument requires more circumspection. What 
makes applying certain features to God non-ad hoc when the arguments 
of natural theology are taken together as a unifi ed set of interrelated ar-
guments? If such features of God are found outside natural theology, it 
is hard to see where these features fi nd their support if not from reveled 
theology. But if this is the case, it is not at all clear that these features are 
‘at home’ in natural theology as required by Moreland’s explanation stated 
above. Indeed, one step of Geivett ’s cumulative case brings the claims of 
revealed religion to bear on the question of God’s existence. But this appeal 
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to revealed knowledge undermines the entire natural theology project as 
historically understood.
How should one characterize this post-Humean natural theology 
project? The distinction between natural theology and revealed religion 
has been signifi cantly blurred. One can understand this as an argument 
against Hume, as a capitulation to Hume, or as the grateful refi nement of 
the natural theology project in light of Hume’s forceful and telling criti-
cisms of earlier, inadequate employments of natural theology. While this 
volume does not give a clear answer to this question, the work done within 
its pages aids greatly one’s att empts to grasp the place of natural theology 
in the broader religious context. In that regard, this volume is a valuable 
addition to contemporary Christian scholarship.
Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, by Denys Turner. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xix + 271. $70.00 (cloth), $29.99 (paper).
DAVID BRADSHAW, University of Kentucky
Denys Turner is a theologian and the author of The Darkness of God (1995), 
a well-received study of mystical theology. In the Preface to the present 
volume he remarks that his earlier book led some to object that he had 
taken apophaticism “to the point of apparently denying that we can say 
anything true of God,” as was not his intent (p. xiii). His goal in Faith, Rea-
son and the Existence of God is to redress that imbalance through a careful 
exploration of what reason can and cannot accomplish in relation to God. 
Specifi cally, Turner (a Roman Catholic) defends the position of the First 
Vatican Council that it is an article of faith that the existence of God can be 
known by natural reason. This might seem to place him at odds with the 
apophatic approach that he earlier defended. Turner, however, believes 
that natural theology and apophaticism are natural allies, for natural the-
ology properly pursued places reason “at the end of its tether,” asking 
“the sorts of questions the answers to which . . . are beyond the power of 
reason to comprehend” (p. xv). If there are rationally compelling proofs of 
the existence of God, as he believes there must be, “what the ‘proofs’ prove 
is at one and the same time the existence of God and that, as said of God, 
we have fi nally lost our hold on the meaning of ‘exists’” (p. 87).
It will be noticed that I say if there are such proofs. Although Turner 
is confi dent that such proofs must be available, he does not himself oﬀ er 
one, nor does he say where in the tradition they are to be found. He holds 
up Aquinas’s Five Ways as a model of how such proofs ought to be done, 
but he makes no att empt to rebut the standard objections to the Five Ways 
or to update Aquinas in contemporary terms. Surprisingly, near the end 
of the book it emerges that Turner’s preferred argument strategy would 
begin with the question, “why is there something rather than nothing?” 
This is of course the question famously posed by Leibniz. Turner seems to 
think that it would be preferable to develop the argument in a Thomistic 
rather than Leibnizian fashion, but he does not elaborate in any detail. His 
